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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE REGENCY. — Before I proceed to what I intended principally to make the subject of observation in this Number, I think it necessary to go back, for a little, to the subject of *Reform*, treated of in my last. I there spoke of the measure as necessary to produce that sort of spirit and union in the country, now so loudly called for by all the circumstances of the nation, both at home and abroad; but, I omitted to notice one possible emergency, in which the beneficial effect of this great conciliatory measure must be felt in a degree hardly to be calculated: I mean, the emergency attending the *total destruction of the Paper-Money*, an emergency, which every one will allow to be *possible*, and which all those, who have much reflected upon the matter, will allow to be *probable*; and, one would think, that there could not be found a man, even amongst the most venal, to deny this position, after the Report of the Bullion Committee and the declarations of many of those men, who, if they possibly could have done it, would still have disguised from the people the real state of the Paper-money. — Mr. HUSKISSON has acknowledged, that the Bank-Notes, in which the Dividends in the Funds are paid, have depreciated 15 per cent, and he has said, in express words, that the Fund-holder now receives only 17 shillings in the pound, out of which he pays 2 shillings more in *Income Tax*, reducing his former pound to 15 shillings. — Mr. HORNE TOOKE long ago said that this would be the case. During the short time that he was in Parliament, he uttered more good sense, upon subjects of Political Oeconomy, than I have ever heard of being uttered in that House for the last 30 years. He dealt not in fine-spun stuff that has no other effect than that of puzzling plain men, and that always has its rise in a want of clear notions in the speaker or writer. He saw the thing clearly himself; and he communicated his knowledge to others, in a way that no man of common sense could fail to understand. — He said it would be as the Bullion Committee have now

declared it to be; he said that the pound of interest in the funds would go on sinking lower and lower in value, till at last (if the progress were not interrupted by some convulsion) the pound of interest would not purchase a *quartern loaf*. — Now, that this depreciation will *continue* is certain. All the powers upon earth cannot prevent it. And it must finally produce its natural and inevitable consequences. These consequences *may* not be attended with any violent shock, though any violent shock that should accelerate or produce the catastrophe, would also make that catastrophe the more dangerous. The *time*, too, may be more or less distant; events from without or within may operate upon the paper system more or less rapidly; but, the death of you or me, reader, is not more certain, than the catastrophe now in contemplation. — This being the case, a wise government will look forward to it; it will be amongst the objects for which such a government will endeavour to provide. And, in the making of such provision, will a wise government leave the temper, the disposition, the wishes, of the people out of the question? Will not a wise government do all that it can to leave the people no solid ground of complaint in such a crisis, when, in spite of all that can be done, so much must depend upon the disposition of the people, and when, indeed, the very existence of the government and the maintenance of order and of law will rest upon that sole foundation? — At such a time there ought to be left in being no great and general grievance; for, is it not manifest, does not common sense, as well as the experience of the world, teach us, that, if such grievance were, at such a time, in being, that the people would not be likely to cease their complaints, and, indeed, that they would seize upon that very moment for urging them in all the ways in their power? — That the present state of the Paper-money may be fairly ascribed to the want of a Reform of Parliament there can, I think, be no doubt; because, it was the want of that Reform that led to an expenditure, which produced the expulsion of gold and the inundation of paper. But, whether this be admitted

or not, there can be no doubt, that, if the system produce any very great and general calamity, the calamity would be traced to that source, and that it would be no wonder if the popular accusations were even to exceed the bounds of the real truth.—Mr. PITT succeeded in keeping down the “democrats,” that is to say, the reformers, in England; but, what was the cost? Six hundred millions added to the national debt, and the present fearful state of the Paper-money! Neither he nor his successors of the same school have succeeded in keeping down the Debt and the Taxes. He often declared, in express terms, that our National Debt was “the best ally of France.” What, then, did he gain by silencing, for a while, his old co-operators for Reform, if, in doing that, he augmented, fourfold, the strength of “France’s best ally?”—That the first war with France arose out of a dread of democracy, a dread of the people of England obtaining too much power, is certain. I do not say, that there were no men, at that time, in England, who wished to overturn the kingly government altogether; but their numbers must have been very small, and they would have been, at once, discovered and effectually put down by the granting of that Reform, for which many of the most eminent men in England had contended, and for which, therefore, it was perfectly reasonable, that the people should still contend.—But, supposing that the well-known moderation of the people of England was not to be trusted; even supposing, that, if not kept down by the means of a war with France and of Barracks and an army at home, the reformers would have gone the length of demanding too great a share for the people. Was it not better to have run that risk than to do what was done? Let us suppose ourselves now in the year 1792, and let me put this question to the great Land-holders in England. “You have now your choice: will you have universal suffrage and annual parliaments in England; or will you add six hundred millions to the national debt, pay ten per cent. upon your income, see France the absolute mistress of the Continent of Europe, and building navies in all her ports wherewith to attack you?”—That man of great estate must, I think, be very perverse indeed, who would not choose the former. What, then, has been gained in this eighteen years struggle against popular principles? What has

been gained by this long “stand against popular encroachment?” What has been gained, I say, by the “success” of “the great man now no more” in keeping down democrats?—And, are we to be answered in the stale cant about “the times” and about the will of Providence to permit this or that? Providence,

“The Universal Cause

“Acts not by partial, but by general laws;”

And, amongst those laws, is this: that wisdom shall, in the end, triumph over folly, and that, in the end, every crime shall bring its own punishment. If the result of this long struggle shall be favourable to those who have pursued the present system in this country, then, indeed, they may boast of its wisdom; but, until that result be known, it will be too soon for them to boast.—In all the concerns of life, be they of what kind they may, the failure of a long series of trials point out the wisdom of a change. This is the wisdom of experience, which is of so very humble a sort that it is possessed even by the brutes. The ox that has found yon corner of the pasture sour, will feed there no more; the horse that has felt the whip will not fail to flinch at its smack. What would be said, then, of the shepherd, who, having, year after year, found the dell to rot his sheep, were still to lead them to the same spot? And, yet, is this more unwise, more absurd, than the conduct of those statesmen, who, having, for many years, seen that their system has produced an annual increase of expence, difficulty, and danger, still adhere to that system?—The system of Anti-Jacobinism; the system of making two distinct classes of the people; the system of keeping down reformers; this system has had an eighteen years trial. The tree is known by its fruit, and the fruit of this system are seen at the Bank, in Ireland, in our Pauper List, across the Channel.—If this be good fruit; if it be such as is pleasant to the taste, and promises a healthful digestion, let the system continue, and let its author be an object of praise; but, if its taste be bitter and its consequences death, let it be changed as quickly as possible. And, as the keeping down of reformers has been the great and prominent feature of the system, let the effects of letting them up again be tried.—We have had experiments enough in other ways. We have had all sorts of commercial and military and naval and diplomatic experiments; we have had warlike and subsidizing experiments;

we have had a *peace* experiment, and we have had an *Union* experiment. What have they all done? Have they led to happiness at home? Have they lessened the number of bankruptcies? Have they strengthened public credit? Have they made us *secure from without*? Well, then, as all these have failed, why not try a new course? Why not see what *reform* would do? It would cost neither lives nor money. It would require neither army nor fleet. It would make no demands upon the War-office, the Admiralty, the Barrack Department, or the Ordnance. Why not try it, then? What else is there left to try? As to *diversions* abroad, they are over. The war in Spain and Portugal is the last of these experiments. What, then is to be done? I ask any one of the abettors of the system to point out any thing that there is left, except the bare *defence* of the country; and any thing that he can *hope* for but that England should be able just to avoid being *conquered* and made a department of the French empire. Indeed, this is all that the "life-and-fortune" men now pretend to hope for; so that they have brought all their high boasting, to a pretty pass. They set out with projects of conquest, and they now *hope* not to be conquered. They set out with resolutions to subdue, with bullying threats against all the republicans in the world, "*crush, stifle, strangle,*" were their words. Nothing short of a complete re-establishment of the old order of things would satisfy them. They looked as big and as bluff as giants amongst pigmies. How changed! Now they whine and cant and turn up their eyes, and, in a consumptive sort of voice, express their fervent hopes that they shall be able to *defend* themselves, or, rather, that they shall be defended by the people, whom they so long calumniated, and no small portion of whom they would gladly have seen hanged. They won the day. They *beat the democrats*. They *subscribed* and *toasted* and *addressed* and *huzzaed*; but, what has the victory availed them? What is their condition *now*? They *beat the reformers*; but, the reformers are still *alive*, and they are not to be killed by any thing. Time, which is hard at work *against* their persecutors, is as hard at work *for* them. There is not, in the whole chapter of events, one that can be favourable to the enemies of reform; and, if the country remains independent, reform will take place.—But, how much better would it be that it should now originate with the

government itself? How gracious this would appear; and what an excellent effect it would have! That this vital measure; this measure, without which all other measures must fail of producing any great good, it will not, perhaps, be in the power of the Regent's ministry to adopt *immediately*; but, as I said in my last (and I cannot repeat it too often) they may immediately give the subject *fair play*; they may evince their *wishes* for reform; for, unless they do this, they may be well assured, that they will have *no support from the people*.—They will take to the government in a fine plight. They will find an enormously expensive war in Spain and Portugal, for the *perseverance* in which they will find all those who profit, either directly or indirectly, *from the taxes*. Such men love war of any sort, if it be but *expensive* and give rise to places and jobs. If they put an end to this war, they will have roused all this description of persons against them; and, if they continue it, they will thereby hasten the Paper-money crisis. Commerce and Manufactures they will find in a ticklish state. The war against the Republicans of France, which, it was boasted by Mr. Pitt and his set, had given us the trade of the whole world, has, at last, led to the destruction of no small part of that trade, with a fair prospect of a much greater destruction.—I, for my own part, do not hold, that *foreign trade* is at all necessary to the maintenance of the independence and the greatness of England. I am quite convinced, that it is not necessary. But, it makes part of the present system; and, at any rate, a great diminution of it must produce a shock; it must, as to certain parts of the kingdom, produce very serious embarrassments; and it must affect the revenue and the means of propping up the Paper-money.—It is quite useless to laugh at the idea of Napoleon's banishing all our trade from the Continent of Europe; for, it is plain that he *will* do it. He has already reduced it to a mere *smuggling trade*. He has so loaded it with embarrassments and penalties, that it cannot be carried on but with a loss to us.—Manufacturing establishments will grow up on the Continent, whither English manufacturers will go, in swarms, as they are now going from Ireland to America. It is preposterous to suppose, that in the countries, whence we draw our raw materials, the same goods cannot be made as we make

in England. Is it not absurd to believe, that, while all the wool that we make into superfine cloth, comes from Spain and Germany, superfine cloth cannot be made in those countries?—See what has been, only by the short operation of the *Embargo* and *Non-intercourse* Acts, done in America. To such an extent have the cloth and cotton manufactories grown up there, that I have been credibly informed, that, during the last year, that the *Cards* for carding wool and cotton, shipped for America from the Port of Liverpool, have exceeded in amount the cloths shipped at the same port, from the counties of Somerset and Gloucester.—I always thought, that the United States could not produce wool in sufficient quantity, on account of the long winters, which prevented the keeping of sheep. This was a wrong notion, grounded upon the universal mode in practice in England, of keeping sheep upon green food in winter. I now find, that, in Germany, whence comes the *finest wool in the world*, and where is (in Silesia) the *very finest flock of sheep in the whole world*, all the sheep are kept in yards during six months in the year, and, no small part of the time actually in houses. These are facts not to be doubted of. The feed of the sheep, during the long winter, consists of hay, straw, and roots, chiefly potatoes; and this being the case, America may have sheep in as great abundance as they are in England.—Indeed, I understand, that very great progress has been already made in the increase of sheep in America, which has received much assistance from the breaking up of the Spanish flocks, of which America has had a share.—So great is the spirit of enterprize in this way, that a very intimate friend of mine, near Philadelphia, wrote to me, in July last, that the price of a *Spanish ram* there was, in some cases, *a thousand dollars*; that is to say, £. 225 of our Bank of England note money. But, there have been great numbers sent to America since that time, from Spain and Portugal; and, which is not a little curious, many thousands, which I, at one time, notified that I expected to receive in *Hampshire*, are, I have every reason to suppose, and, for the sake of the worthy owner, I anxiously hope it, *now safely landed in the United States!* His wish, they being the finest flock in Spain, was to bring them to England, where his intention was to have made a most liberal and public-spirited distribution of them; but, as I under-

stand, he was refused leave to send them home in empty transports, and was, therefore, compelled either to leave them for the French, or ship them off to the United States, and, of course, he chose the latter; and, thus, perhaps, by this single act, the epoch of the final and complete independence of America upon England for woollens will be accelerated by several years; and, with regard to the *fineness* of wool, that country will be, at once, put upon an equal footing with this.—There would be no excuse for a detail like this, were I not thoroughly persuaded, that we have here before us the seeds of a great event; *nothing less than the complete and absolute independence of America upon English Manufactures.* Cotton she had to export; Iron she had to export; she had every thing but wool, and now she has that with an abundance of food for all sorts of manufacturèrs; so that, in a very short time, so far will she be from wanting woollens from England, that she will have them to export, and that the manufacturèrs will follow the manufactory there can be no doubt at all. She will be able to make cloths much cheaper than we can; and, of course, she will be able to sell them cheaper.—Now, observe, I draw from this, no conclusion unfavourable to the happiness or the security or the greatness of England, none of which are at all favoured by the country's being a *workshop for other nations.* I am satisfied that foreign trade is injurious to England; and that it has been one of the great causes of the dangers she now has to dread. But, as I said before, foreign trade is a *part of the present system of finance*, and its sudden decline must add to the difficulties that the government will have to encounter.—The Regent's ministry, therefore, will not, in this respect, be upon "*a bed of roses*," any more than as to matters connected with war and paper-money. They will, in short, be beset with difficulties. Look which way they will these difficulties face them, not in single rank, but in column. And, do they imagine, that they are destined to subdue all these without the *cordial co-operation of the people*? If they do, they will find themselves most egregiously deceived.—There is one other measure that I shall mention here, and which, if they have any regard for their reputation as ministers, or any desire of keeping their places for four months, they will, one would think, not fail to set about, the moment they get into office. I mean, the causing to be made a *full and clear state-*

ment of the *situation of the nation*, in the several departments of *army, navy, church, poor, taxation, paper-money, colonies, foreign trade*, and, above all, the *liberty of the subject* and the *representation in parliament*.—

When any man, in private life, takes a trust out of the hands of another, he never fails to have a clear statement made out of the situation of every part of the concern, unless he means to take upon him responsibility for the *past* as well as for the *future*. Common prudence points this out; and, at this time, I am sure, that every consideration that ought to have weight with men in power points it out to those who shall be ministers of the Regent. Some of them remember being twitted of coming in upon a *bed of roses*. It will be their *own fault*, if they be thus twitted again. They took to the concern before with the hope of *jogging on* in the *old way*. They were forewarned of the consequences. They were told, that the Roses and Castlereaghs would beat them at that. They despised the warning; but, at the end of 15 months, they found it verified; they found themselves where they will again find themselves, at the end of less than another 15 months, unless they adopt a widely different course.—They seemed then to have adopted the opinion, that *place* would do every thing, and that *principle* was nothing; that, after representing the system of Mr. Pitt as the most unwise and wicked in the world, they might safely pursue it; and that, having got into place, they might, with impunity, extol the public virtues of Mr. Pitt, and even vote a reward, out of the people's pockets, to his *public services*, in the teeth of those amongst whom they had gained credit solely by their reprobation of his public character and public conduct. This was the most cutting affront that ever was offered to the understandings and feelings of a nation, and as such it made a deep and lasting impression; an impression that it will not be easy to wear away.—When they had once been prevailed upon to do this; when they had once identified themselves with the public character of the man, whose public character it had been the business of their whole political lives to reprobate, they were, in fact, from that moment bound hand and foot, and at the mercy of their enemies; for the *people* cared just as much for one party as they did for the other; and, of all the ministries that I ever knew, or heard of, the turning out of no one ever excited so little

regret.—Let them *beware*, then; for the minds of the people are not changed, and never will and never can be changed, as to the system of the last 26 years.—But, the Regency ministers have another, and still higher, consideration to weigh with them. The late ministry acted under the same *head* which Mr. Pitt and his set had acted under. The Regency ministers will have a new head. If, therefore, they again take up the system; if they again take it under their protection; if they again identify themselves, by eulogies or otherwise, with the public character of Mr. Pitt, what shall we say of their conduct *towards the Regent himself*? He stands clear, in the eyes of the people, of any, even the smallest, participation in that system. *He* has had no art or part in any of the measures of the last 26 years. *He* has had no hand in adding six hundred millions to the national debt. *He* has had nothing to do with the Pitt wars against republican principles. *He* had nothing to do in the *successes* over democrats. *He* has had no hand in the measures which have augmented the taxes fourfold. *He* has never had any thing to do with that system which has augmented the poor-rates from 2 to 5 millions. In short, he stands *new, fresh, and fair* before the people, whom, in the course of nature, he is destined to govern. He is a sheet of unsoiled paper; and, ought not his advisers to take care, how they cause it to begin by writing upon it, "*the system of Pitt*"? Ought they not to be very careful how they pledge him to this, how they identify him with what has been so fatal to England, and the sound of which will, to the latest ages, be so hateful to English ears?—Thus have I stated, *in time*, what it appears to me the Regent's ministry ought to *think about*, at least, the moment they are in power, and even *before* they are there.—As to the Bill, now before the House of Lords for making the Prince Regent, there is nothing more to be said upon the subject. It is well understood. The *principles* have all been amply discussed, and whether *one fourth* or *one half* of the regal powers and prerogatives are withheld from the Regent makes no difference at all. The *principles* are, and must remain, the same; and, whether they be violated little or much, the same objection must exist.—Our eyes must now be turned towards the *measures* that will be pursued; and, all that I shall say upon them now is, that, after having pointed

out those which appear to me to be most essential, I have only to add, that I wish the whole of them may be good; and, that, be they what they may, I shall, in giving my opinion of them, divest myself of all prejudice and partiality.—In the mean while, as connected with this subject, I cannot forbear making a few remarks upon one more passage that appeared in the *COURIER* (the leading venal print) of the 23rd instant.—The venal man is commenting upon a speech of Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY, upon the subject of the means used to excite *suspensions* against the PRINCES. "Review the doctrines contained in these extracts. The Regent should not be responsible, though his office is not supreme, but merely a delegated temporary trust. Who ever heard before of a deputy being irresponsible to his principal, or any other authority?—Mr. Fox, at the Shakespeare Tavern, in October 1801, publicly exulted in the example afforded by the French Revolution, of the right and power of the people to cashier Kings for misconduct; but the Foxites of the present day will not allow even a King's deputy to be responsible. Was it candid to talk of proceeding against the Regent by information, as if so high an officer would be sued like a common culprit? Was it not invidious and inflammatory to represent him as degraded to the rank of an Exciseman because he was required to take an oath, though the King himself takes one? The Opposition would in reality exalt the office of Regent above that of King! It was humourously remarked that Mr. Burke's brother thought himself a greater man than Burke, because he was his brother; and now the Opposition would have the Regent a greater man than the King, because he is his deputy! No law must be made to restrain the Prince. *Every thing must be trusted to his magnanimity: to controul is to insult him.* Such language as this might lead a Prince of weak intellects, of an irritable, impatient, and arbitrary temper, to dissolve the parliament for ever, as a body that did nothing but insult him, stigmatise him, degrade him to the rank of an Exciseman, and render him liable to prosecution like a petty offender. Yet this, according to the Newspaper reports, is the language of the Foxites, those friends of freedom! If they will trust every thing to the Prince's discretion, what is the use of a Parliament?

"Why not reform it as a regiment is reformed, by disbanding it altogether, substituting a military government in its stead? We have already made too great a progress towards a military Government; and the Opposition, by piquing the Prince personally, by representing the conduct of Parliament as personally offensive to his Royal Highness, seem desirous of preparing his mind to resort to one. No arguments against the restrictions can be referred to the Prince personally without being in their nature highly unconstitutional, as making our safety depend upon his discretion, rather than upon the law; and those who can use them are fitter to become the Ministers of the Seraglio than of a free Country. Were the Prince a weak, imperious man, fond only of flatterers and sycophants, with such an abject fawning Ministry as the Opposition seem ready to become, and the *Burdett mob* at his heels, the Country would have cause to tremble. But his Royal Highness has too much good sense to be influenced by the crawling adulation of slaves, and too great a love of the liberties of his country, to encourage the anarchical tyranny of a mob."—If the fact were not so notorious that this man is actuated solely by a love of gain, one would really suppose, that he had heated his brain into insanity. One is at a loss to decide between the impudence and the nonsense of this passage. This sentence insinuates that the Prince is disposed to call in the aid of military force wherewith to put down the parliament, and the next, that he wishes to have the "*Burdett mob*" at his heels, as if the two would so cordially unite!—But, the main drift of the thing is to inculcate the notion, that those who are opposed to the restrictions wish to introduce some new powers and give them to the Regent; that they want to "set him above the King;" that they are willing to "entrust every thing to his magnanimity;" that they are willing to leave all to his discretion;" that they are willing to depend upon his discretion rather than upon the law."—What an impudent, what an unprincipled, what a shameless man this must be! For my part, I cannot form an idea of any thing so base in human nature as those qualities that can enable a man to act thus. He knows that every man of sense and information will perceive the grossness, the foulness, of his misrepresentation; but, he also knows,

that the uninformed will not, and that the whole of the corrupt tribe will be pleased with him; and thus, for the sake of deceiving the ignorant and obtaining the approbation of the corrupt, he knowingly and voluntarily incurs the contempt and detestation of those whom he is compelled to respect.—Where is the man who has, at any time, expressed a wish to invest the Prince with any *new* powers? Who has proposed to set him *above* the King? Who has ever thought of depending upon his *magnanimity rather than upon law*?—What we, who object to the restrictions and oaths and conditions say, is this: that, as the Prince is to fill the office of the King, he ought to possess *all the powers of the King*, during the time that he fills that office; and *no other powers*. We say, that he ought to take no oath *that the King did not take*. We say, that he ought to be *no more responsible than the King was*. We say, that it is an outrageous insult, not only to the PRINCE, but to common sense, *to suppose him less fit to be trusted with power than the King*; but, so far from saying, that we are willing to trust to his discretion *rather than to law*, we have said, over and over again, that he ought to have not an atom of power, not *awarded him by the constitution*, that is to say, the *settled laws of the land*.—This is what we have, all along, said, and this is what we continue to say. We say, that, if any one will bring forward a proposition for *diminishing the prerogatives of the Crown*, we shall cheerfully hear him, and discuss the matter with him. Such a measure may possibly be proper; but, we say, that no such proposition is offered to us; we say, that it is not a *diminution*, but a *division* that is proposed; and, we say, that, in a division, which would *separate a part of the prerogatives from the office of King*, we see a departure of the principles of our constitution, which holds, that “the prerogatives are *vested in the Crown for the benefit of the people*.” We say, that this separating must consider the prerogatives in the light of *personal property*; and that we do not so consider them.—Plain as all this is; consonant as it is with all just notions of freedom; evident as are the truth and justice of it; yet, this venal writer finds his account in perversion, or, we may be assured that he would not take the pains to pervert. His readers consist, for the most part, of those bigotted and intolerant people throughout the country, who had their heads well crammed with Anti-Jacobinism about 12

or 15 years ago, and who are busied much more about the means of “putting down *“Jacobins and Levellers,”* than about defending their country; those incorrigibly stupid animals, who even to this hour, tell you of the *glorious* prospect in Spain and Portugal, and who *laugh* at Massena and even at his master; who, when you remind them of the fleets preparing in all the ports of Europe, answer you by repeating the saying about the “*wooden walls of Old England*;” and who, were they to see, or hear of, the approach of a French army of only five thousand men, would, if they could, sink into the very bowels of the earth. These are the bigotted, intolerant, stupid, and cowardly people, to whom this writer addresses himself. Stupid as they are, however, they are more malignant than stupid, and though, at bottom, they despise him (and he knows it), their malice is fed by him, and thus he has a hold which he well knows they cannot shake off.—To these he adds the *elect* amongst the *corrupted and corruptors*. All those whose object it is to live unfairly, in one way or another, upon the people’s earnings, to fatten upon their sweat: and who, rather than see the means of doing this put quite beyond their reach for ever, would cheerfully view the destruction of half the nation by fire and sword. The prevalence of justice is, to such people, certain destruction. They cannot breathe the same air with truth and justice. Let delusion cease, and they perish without the assistance of either violence or law. This race is in *great alarm* at present, and all that I can say is, that I sincerely hope that their alarm *may not prove groundless*.

STAFFORDSHIRE ELECTION.—Below I insert two letters, to which I beg leave to call the reader’s attention.—Mr. WOLSELEY does, it seems, mean to make a stand in that County, upon the principle of Mr. BURCOYNE in Essex; whereat SIR JOHN WROTTESLEY seems to be very angry. To be sure! That is very natural. That any man should attempt to give the Freeholders of any County an opportunity of voting for a man who will pledge himself to demand their rights, is ground for anger, in such a case.—I hope, I shall live, however, to see this done in every county; and that elections will become something a little more than mere meetings of a family or two, surrounded by their tenants.—If the *really independent* of every County were to unite, they would

carry all county elections, in spite of all the jobbing that can, even now, be made use of; or, at the very least, they would give the jobbers and family compacts so much trouble and mortification, that an election would be to them a serious matter.

—The yeomen and tradesmen are not just to themselves. They want spirit to assert what is their due. They shrink at great names, which only means great riches. And, why should they? What is there in the name of *Wrottesley* more than in that of *Hodgeson* or *Jackson* or *Williamson*? *Man* is *man*, and nothing more. There are only two sorts of superiority: one of *body*, the other of *mind*. If farmer *Hodgeson* can beat Sir John *Wrottesley* at boxing, he is, in that way, the *best man* of the two; and if he, or any other farmer or tradesman, has more *sense* and *virtue* than Sir John, he is the *best man* here again. It is a base abandonment of a man's rights to acknowledge any other kind of superiority, unless it be exacted by the law; and, I am quite sure, that there is no law yet in England, that calls upon farmer *Hodgeson* to acknowledge his inferiority to Sir John *Wrottesley*.—*Modesty* is becoming in all men, but modesty calls upon no one to acknowledge himself inferior to another man, unless he is conscious of bodily or mental inferiority; and as to *money* and *lands*, if I were to pitch upon an infallible sign of baseness, it would be a proneness to acknowledge superiority in the rich.—I shall return to this subject, and, in the mean while, I most heartily wish Mr. *Wolseley* success.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
January 25, 1811.

STAFFORDSHIRE ELECTION.

Letter from Sir John Wrottesley to the Editor of the Wolverhampton Chronicle.

Sir; A Letter having appeared in the *Staffordshire Advertiser*, signed C. *Wolseley*, I address you as affording me an earlier opportunity of an explicit declaration upon the subject of its contents. An answer to Mr. *Wolseley* is unnecessary; and to him, I must add those, who, like himself, consider my brother's election as conclusive of an understanding between the families. But for enabling me to explain to more cautious and impartial gentlemen, who hear the evidence before they decide the cause, he has my thanks.

—In consequence of a reported insinuation of Mr. *Wolseley* at the last nomination, which at the election he positively denied, I felt it incumbent upon me to state openly the connection that had subsisted between the late lord *Stafford* and myself, and flattered myself that I had proved, to the satisfaction of every person, and even to this gentleman, that that connection was not renewed with the present marquis. This open declaration did not tend to improve that common intercourse of civilities which might and often does subsist without any political consideration; and beyond the formal exchange of visits in London, nothing has taken place by word of mouth, letter or message, or any, even the slightest conversation that could tend either to general or local politics.—As to my brother's election, I had no intimation of his intention, till he had determined to offer himself a candidate for *Brackley*. At the age of thirty-eight he is wholly independent of me, and capable of forming his own opinions. Had he asked my advice, I should have given it with that sincerity and friendship which has ever subsisted between us. But the measure was determined upon before I knew it; and my advice not having been asked, I certainly never intruded it; particularly at a time, when it could no longer avail.—The only application to me, was for a qualification, and, for the first time in my life, I refused him; because I was resolved not to give so unequivocal a proof of my approbation.—To these circumstances, I add a declaration, upon my honour as a gentleman, that no political connection whatever has subsisted between lord *Stafford* and myself since I quitted *Litchfield*; and while I shall feel flattered with the support of those who give me credit for this assertion, I scorn to accept it from any man who considers me as capable of the smallest deviation from truth.—But the true motives of this letter appear in the postscript; no man who reads it will doubt that Mr. *Wolseley* intends to become a candidate for the representation of the county, after the example of Mr. *Burgoyne* in *Essex*. If these are his intentions, it would be more manly to make an open and explicit declaration, resting his pretensions, rather upon his own merits, than attempting to detract from the character of others.—I am, Sir, your very obedient humble servant,

JOHN WROTTESELEY.

Wrottesley, Jan. 12, 1811.

MR. WOLSELEY'S ANSWER.

To the Freeholders of the County of Stafford.

GENTLEMEN; Sir John Wrottesley has published in the Wolverhampton Newspaper of the 16th inst. a letter in answer to mine, inserted in the Staffordshire Advertiser of the 12th inst. in which I expressed my doubts of his claims to represent this county in Parliament; I lament that he has thought it necessary. It is impossible for me to be personally hostile to Sir John Wrottesley; but I have so great an affection for my family, that I never can or shall allow myself, under any circumstances, to degrade myself so far, as to disavow publicly the conduct of an honourable brother, whom I profess sincerely to love and esteem: I have so high an opinion of Sir John Wrottesley, that I cannot allow myself to suspect, that he differs from these sentiments. But will Sir J. W. say that there is any merit in him in refusing a qualification to his brother, to enable him to be the representative of a rotten borough, under the auspices of the Marquis of Stafford; will he say that the member for Brackley, can in honour vote otherwise, than as the Marquis of Stafford directs? Now, does Sir John Wrottesley mean this, that he refused the qualification to his brother for fear of becoming a party to the fraud? or does he mean to say that it is upon principle, that he is an enemy to fraudulent qualifications. The county has a right to an explicit declaration on these points.—Sir John Wrottesley has stated it would be manly in me to make an open and explicit declaration, as to my pretensions. I flatter myself that the Freeholders of the County will think this letter sufficiently manly, open and explicit. I now call upon Sir J. Wrottesley to be as explicit, as open, and as manly. Sir J. Wrottesley says 'But the true motives of this letter appear in the postscript: no man who reads it will doubt that Mr. Wolseley intends to become a candidate for the representation of the county, after the example of Mr. Burgoyne, in Essex. If these are his intentions it would be more manly to make an open and explicit declaration, resting his pretensions rather upon his own merits, than attempting to detract from the character of others.' This requires an open and explicit declaration; my explanation shall be a manly one. The principles on which a person ought to be sent to serve in Parliament, are to keep

the Prerogative of the Crown unimpaired—to secure the liberties of the People—to oppose in every shape the system of Mr. Pitt's administration; and to obtain a radical reform in the Representation of the People in Parliament.—These are my principles, are they those of Sir J. Wrottesley? If he will distinctly avow them, I will resign all my pretensions to him, and will give him my most cordial support; but if he will not make this avowal, he will find in me a decided opponent, and I can assure the county, that I will give the Freeholders, at the next election, an opportunity of shewing whether their principles coincide with mine.—There is an old proverb, "Those who buy dear cannot afford to sell cheap." As I do not mean to sell you, I shall be at no expence in procuring your votes; it is your business more than mine; to ride to Stafford is very little trouble to you; but to do your business in Parliament will be a heavy burthen upon me: honourable as that burthen is, I have no anxiety to undergo it, if Sir J. Wrottesley, or any other person of respectability will bear it:—But I am resolved the county shall have an opportunity of declaring their sentiments.—In the present situation of the world, every thing depends on the energies of the people. Will you come forward and express by your votes, your detestation of the corruptions in Parliament, or will you shew that you submit? It was by such submission, with the aid of the politics of Mr. Pitt, that Napoleon has become the master of the world.—

C. WOLSELEY.

Wolseley Park, Jan. 18, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, made to the Congress, 11th Dec. 1810.*

In obedience to the directions of the Act supplementary to the Act entitled, "An Act to establish the Treasury Department," the Secretary of the Treasury respectfully submits the following Report and Estimates:—

REVENUE.

The net revenue arising from duties on merchandize and tonnage which accrued during the year 1808, amounted to 10,348,000 dollars.

The net revenue arising from the same sources, which accrued during the year

1809, amounted, as will appear by the statement (A) to 6,527,000 dollars.

The statement (B) exhibits in detail the several species of merchandize and other sources from which that revenue was derived during the year 1809.

It is ascertained that the net revenue arising from the same duties, has, for the three first quarters of the year 1810, exceeded 7,500,000 dollars; and it is believed that it will not, for the whole year, fall short of 12 millions.

The sales of public lands North of the River Ohio, have, during the year ending on the 30th of September, 1810, as appears by the statement (C) amounted to 159,000 acres, and the payments by purchasers to 610,000 dollars.

The same statement shews that the total amount of sales, from the establishment of the land offices in the year 1800, to the 30th of September, 1810, have amounted to 3,168,000 acres, which produced 6,681,000 dollars; of which sum 1,648,000 dollars remain due by purchasers. The sales in the Mississippi territory, being (after deducting expences) appropriated in the first place to the payment of 1,250,000 dollars to the State of Georgia, are distinctly stated.

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

1. Year ending 30th Sept. 1810.

The actual Receipts in the Treasury, during the year ending on the 30th of September, 1810, have amounted to..... Dollars 8,688,861 17
Making, together with the balance in the Treasury, on the 1st October, 1809, and amounting to..... 5,828,936 1

An Aggregate of14,517,797 18

The disbursements during the same year have consisted in the following items, viz.

Civil Department, including miscellaneous expences, and those incidental to the intercourse with foreign nations 1,219,200 06
Military and Indian Departments 2,514,623 75
Navy 1,674,735 50
..... 4,189,259 25
Interest on the Public Debt 2,735,198 91

Total current expences ... 8,174,358 22
Payment on account of the principal of the Public Debt 2,884,409 24

Amounting together, as will appear more in detail by the statement (E) to11,058,767 46
And leaving in the Treasury on the 30th Sept. 1810, a balance of ... 3,459,020 72

14,517,797 18

It therefore appears that the actual receipts into the Treasury have exceeded the current expences of Government, including thereon the interest on the debt, by a sum of five hundred thousand dollars. The expences had, during the preceding year, exceeded the receipts by a sum of thirteen hundred thousand dollars. The difference arises, not from an increase in the receipts, but from a diminution in the expences, particularly those of the military and naval departments.

2. Last Quarter of the Year 1810.

The receipts for that quarter will, it is believed, be more than sufficient to defray the current expences and interest on the debt accruing during the same period. But the payments to be made on account of the principal of the debt in order to complete the annual appropriation of eight millions of dollars, amounting to more than 5,100,000, a loan first negotiated for 3,750,000, and afterwards reduced to 2,750,000, became necessary. The receipts and disbursements for that quarter are therefore estimated as follows:

Receipts into the Treasury from the ordinary revenue	2,500,000
Proceeds of the loan receivable on 31st Dec. 1810	2,750,000
Balance in the Treasury on the 1st October, 1810	3,460,000
	<hr/> 8,710,000

Expences, Civil, Military, and Naval, estimated	1,570,000
Interest accruing on the domestic debt	500,000
	<hr/> 2,070,000

Payments on account of the public debt, in order to complete the annual appropriation of eight millions, and including the reimbursement of 31st Dec. 1810, on the six per cent. and deferred stocks, and that of same date of 3,751,125 exchanged six per cent. stock	4,640,000
	<hr/> 6,710,000

Probable balance in the Treasury on 31st Dec. 1810	2,000,000
	<hr/> 8,710,000

3. Year 1811.

The outstanding revenue bonds, after deducting the expences of collection and allowing for bad debts, will not probably, on the 1st Jan. 1811, fall short of eleven millions and a half of dollars: the actual receipts for the year 1811, on account of the sales of lands, may be estimated at five hundred thousand; and it is presumed that the portion of the re-

venue arising from importations subsequent to the present year, which will be received in 1811, will be more than sufficient to pay the debentures payable in that year. The actual receipts into the Treasury during that year may therefore be estimated at 12,500,000

Estimating the expences of Government for the year 1811 not to exceed the amount actually expended during the year ending the 30th of Sept. 1810, that is to say—

Expences of a civil nature, both domestic and foreign 1,240,000
Military and Naval Departments 4,190,000
5,430,000

And adding thereto the interest on the Public Debt, estimated 2,550,000

The aggregate of the current expences, exclusively of the payments on account of the principal of the debt, would not exceed..... 7,980,000

The payments on account of the principal of the debt will be applicable to the annual reimbursement on the six per cent. and deferred stocks, to the re-payment of the loan of 2,750,000 dollars effected this year, and to the reimbursement in part of the converted six per cent. stock; and must, in order to complete the annual appropriation of eight millions of dollars, amount to 5,450,000

Making for the whole amount of the expenditures of the year 1811 13,430,000
Or about one million of dollars more than the receipts for the same year.

If therefore, this estimate could be relied on, an authority to borrow one million of dollars would be sufficient to enable Government to pay all the current expences, and to reimburse nearly four millions and a half of the principal debt, leaving at the same time in the Treasury a balance of two millions of dollars, a sum not greater than what under existing circumstances it is eligible to reserve. But a deficiency may take place in receipts, if the amount of debentures should exceed what has been estimated; and the expences for the Military and Naval Departments (which, according to the estimates of those Departments, and exclusively of the sum necessary for fortification, amount to 4,916,000 dollars) may be greater than the amount actually expended during the year ending on the 30th September 1810. In order to provide for these and other unforeseen contingencies, the propriety of authorising a re-loan not exceeding in the whole the amount of the principal of the debt reimbursed during the same year, is respectfully submitted.

Public Debt.

It appears by the statement (D) that the payments on account of the principal of the public debt, have amounted during the year ending on the 30th day of September, 1810, to 2,884,000 dollars; and during the nine years and a half ensuing on the same day to near 37,700,000 dollars exclusively of more than six millions of dollars paid in conformity with the provisions of the Convention with Great Britain and of the Louisiana Convention.

Taking the calendar year 1810 by itself the principal of the debt actually reimbursed, will amount to 5,163,376 dollars, viz.

Annual reimbursement of six per cent and deferred stocks 1,412,251
Reimbursement of the six per cent. Exchange Stock 3,751,125
5,163,376
From which deducting the Loan from the Bank of 2,750,000

Leaves for the actual encrease of the debt, during the year 2,413,376

The loan authorised by the Act of last Session, had at first been negotiated in the latter end of May, for 3 750,000 dollars; but the expence having proved less than had been supposed, it was reduced in October to 2,750,000. With that object in view, and in order that no greater sum should be ultimately borrowed than might be necessary, and also in order to avoid as long as possible an increase of stock in the market, and that of a more permanent species of debt, a temporary loan from the Bank of the United States, was preferred to any other mode. It is reimbursable on the last day of December 1811, with a reservation that the Bank may, in case of a non-renewal of its charter, demand an earlier payment on giving three months notice. This condition may, if enforced, save some interest to the public, and can produce no inconvenience, as there will be no greater difficulty in effecting a new loan (if necessary) in the middle than in the latter end of the year. The documents F G H I shew both the object and the terms of the loan.

From what has been stated it appears that no other provisions are necessary for the year 1811, than a continuance of the additional 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty, commonly called the Mediterranean Fund, and an authority to borrow a sum, probably much less, and certainly not greater than the amount of the principal of the public

debt, which will be reimbursed during the year. But as in conformity with the act of the 1st of May, 1810, the importation of articles, the growth, produce, or manufactures of the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of Great Britain will be prohibited after the 2d day of February next, if that nation shall not before that time, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, some provisions appear necessary to be made for supplying the deficiency arising from that cause, and for giving to the revenue arising from that measure all the efficiency of which it is susceptible.

The probable defalcation in the Revenue cannot, for obvious reasons,—be at this time estimated with any degree of precision. The experience of the ensuing year can alone afford a sufficient data for a permanent and detailed plan adapted to that state of things, and calculated to ensure perseverance in the system as long as may be thought proper. But in the mean while, it appears essential to lay the foundation of such plan, and to guard in time against any great deficit in the receipts of the year 1812.

It is believed that under existing circumstances it would be sufficient to render those receipts equal or nearly equal to the current expenditure, including therein the interests on the public debt, and estimated at about eight millions of dollars; and with a view to that object, a considerable and immediate increase of the present duties on importation is respectfully suggested.

It is not less important that that the Act should be free from legal difficulties and of well-founded objections, and that it should be enforced by every practicable means. On that subject the following observations are submitted:—

1. The law of the 1st May 1810, has neither expressly defined the edict, the revocation of which is expected, nor made a notification by the President of the evidence and the sole evidence of the fact. It follows that in case of an unsatisfactory modification of her edicts by Great Britain, the decision of the question itself whether the Non-Importation be actually in force or not, will be left to the Courts, whence delays and embarrassments will arise, which will considerably impede the operation of the law.

2. The Non-Importation is to take place on the 2d of February next, if a revoca-

tion shall not have taken place before that day. But this may have taken place and not be known on that day in the United States. If the Collectors abstain from seizing merchandize imported after that day, until the fact shall have been ascertained, and the edicts shall not have been revoked, the merchandize will escape forfeiture, and the law during that period will be in-operative. If they seize, and the edicts shall have been revoked, the seizure will have been illegal, and the Collectors will be liable to personal suits. This inconvenience may be remedied by a provision, directing that during that period, it shall be the duty of the Collectors to make seizures, but that the goods shall be restored to the parties on their giving bond with sureties for their value.

3. No exception has been made by the Act in favour of vessels which had sailed for the British East Indies prior to the President's Proclamation; and the short period of three months from the date of that Proclamation to the day when the law is to take effect, will occasion forfeiture or heavy losses in cases of *bonâ fide* American property in England paid for or ordered prior to the Proclamation. It seems in every point of view eligible that cases clearly foreseen should be provided for by law, instead of being left to executive discretion.

4. It is believed that an abandonment by the United States of their share of the penalties and forfeitures which may be incurred, and the distribution of these according to the circumstances of the case, amongst the Collectors, the other Custom-house Officers, the Inspectors and others, who heretofore had no share, and the informer, in order to insure the greater degree of zeal and vigilance in detecting infringements of the law.

5. Some additional provisions will be necessary to enforce the law on the Northern frontier of the United States, amongst which may be reckoned the erection of some new collection districts, particularly on the river St. Lawrence and in the Eastern part of the state of Vermont; an increase of pay to the Collectors in that quarter, inasmuch as under the Non-Importation, that part of their compensation which is derived from fees will be considerably reduced, and that which arises from commissions altogether lost; and an authority to the armed force of the United States to make seizures. And it must be added, that the peculiar situation

of those districts will render condemnations extremely difficult, unless the obligation be imposed on persons claiming merchandize seized there to prove that the same was legally imported.—All which is respectfully submitted, ALBERT GALLATIN.

HANS TOWNS.—*Union of them to France.—Distribution of their Territory and Government.*—30th Dec. 1810.

Art. I. Holland, the Hans Towns, Lauenburg, and the territories which lie between the North Sea and a line which shall extend from the place where the Lippe enters the Rhine, to its sources; from these sources to the Upper Ems; from the Ems to the entrance of the Werra into the Weser; and from Stolzenau on the Weser to the Elbe, above the junction of the Sleskniss, shall form an integral part of the French Empire.—II. The said territories shall form 10 Departments, namely:—The Department of the Zuyder Zee, of the mouths of the Maese, of the Upper Yssel, the mouths of the Yssel, East Friesland, the West Ems, the East Ems, the Upper Ems, the mouths of the Weser, and the mouths of the Elbe.—III. The number of Deputies from these Departments to the Legislative Body shall be as follows:

For the Department of the Zuyder Zee	- - - 4
Mouths of the Maese	- - - 4
Upper Yssel	- - - 3
Mouths of the Yssel	- - - 2
East Friesland	- - - 2
West Ems	- - - 2
East Ems	- - - 2
Upper Ems	- - - 4
Mouths of the Weser	3
Mouths of the Elbe	- 4

IV. These Deputies shall be appointed in the year 1811, and shall be renewed in the year to which the Series belongs, in which the department to which they belong shall be placed.—V. These departments shall be placed in the following Series of the Legislative Body, namely:—First Series, mouths of the Maese and West Ems; 2nd Series, Friesland and the Upper Ems; 3rd Series, the Zuyder Zee and East Ems; 4th Series, mouths of the Yssel, and mouths of the Elbe; 5th Series, Upper Yssel, and mouths of the Weser.—VI. For the Departments of the Zuyder Zee, mouths of the Maese, Upper Yssel, mouths of the Yssel, Friesland, and West Ems, there shall be an Imperial Court of Justice, whose seat shall be at the Hague.—VII. For the Departments of East Ems, Upper Ems, the Weser, and the mouths of

the Elbe, there shall be an Imperial Court of Justice, whose seat shall be at Hamburg.—VIII. In the Departments which belong to the Jurisdiction of the Imperial Court of Justice at the Hague, there shall be a Council of Senators; and another shall be erected in the Departments which belong to the jurisdiction of the Imperial Court of Justice at Hamburg.—IX. The cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck are placed among the number of good cities; their Mayors are to be present at the oath of fealty to the Emperors at their Coronation.—X. A communication shall be formed with the Baltic by a canal, which, extending from the canal of Hamburg to Lubeck, shall make a communication between the Elbe and the Weser, the Weser and the Ems, and the Ems and the Rhine.

AMERICA.—*Letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Smith, Sec. of State.*

Sir;—On the 27th of November, Mr. Brownell delivered to me your letters of the 11th, 14th, and 23d, of the preceding month, and on the Saturday following I had a conference with the Marquis Wellesley, in the course of which I explained to him fully the grounds upon which I was instructed to request Mr. Jackson's immediate recall, and upon which the official intercourse between that minister and the American Government has been suspended.—Lord Wellesley's reception of what I said to him was frank and friendly, and I left him with a persuasion that we should have no cause to be dissatisfied with the final course of his government on the subjects of our conference.—We agreed that the interview could only be introductory to a more formal proceeding on my part; and it was accordingly settled between us, that I should present an official letter to the effect of my verbal communication.—Having prepared such a letter, I carried it myself to Downing-street a few days afterwards, and accompanied the delivery to Lord Wellesley with some explanatory observations, with which it is not, I presume, necessary to trouble you. You will find a copy of this letter inclosed, and will be able to collect from it the substance of the greater part of the statements and remarks which I thought it my duty to make in the conversation above mentioned.—Although I was aware that the answer to my letter would not be very hastily given, I certainly was not pre-

pared to expect the delay which has actually occurred. The President will do me the justice to believe that I have used every exertion consistent with discretion, and the nature of the occasion, to shorten that delay, which though not ascribable, as I persuade myself, to any motive unfriendly or disrespectful to the United States, may, I am persuaded, have been productive of some disadvantage. A copy of the answer received on the day of its date is enclosed.—Between the delivery of my letter and the receipt of the reply, I had frequent conversations with Lord Wellesley, some of which were at his own request, and related altogether to the subject of my letter. The rest were on other subjects, but Mr. Jackson's affair was incidentally mentioned in all. A particular account of what was said on these several occasions, would scarcely be useful, and would not fail to be tedious. It will, perhaps, be sufficient to observe, that although these conversations were less satisfactory to me than the first, there was always apparent anxiety on the part of Lord Wellesley to do what was conciliatory; and that in the share which I took in them, I was governed in the opinion, that although it might become my duty to avoid with more than ordinary care the appearance of my being a party to the ultimate proceeding of the British Government on my official representation, it could not be otherwise than proper in any turn which the affair could take, that I should avail myself of every opportunity of bringing to Lord Wellesley's mind such considerations as were calculated to produce a beneficial influence on the form and character of the proceeding. In what light the President will view the course, which after so much consideration, this Government has adopted, it will not become me even to conjecture. If in manner or effect it should not fulfil his expectations, I shall have to regret, that the success of my humble endeavours to make it what it ought to be, has not been proportioned to my zeal and diligence.—Of my letter to Lord Wellesley, of the 2nd of January, I have very little to say. I trust it will be found faithful to my instructions; and that while it maintains the honour of my Government, it does not neglect what is due to conciliation.—I am not sure that I ought to have quoted in it your letter to me, of the 1st November, of which the substance is undoubtedly given in the quotation of your subsequent

letter of the 23d of the same month. But I saw no objection to a repetition of the just and amicable sentiments expressed in these quotations; and as I had been induced, at my first interview with Lord Wellesley, to read to his Lordship each of the passages, I thought that I was in some sort bound to the introduction of both in my written communication.—My letter avoids all discussion, and all invitations to discussions on the business of the Chesapeake, on the Orders in Council, and on topics which circumstances have connected with both. It does not, however, entirely pass them by, but contains such references to them as I had supposed were likely to be useful. I am assured that in this respect I have acted in conformity with the President's intentions. Indeed, if I had acted otherwise, I should have complicated and embarrassed a question which I was ordered to simplify, and forced into combination the peculiar difficulties of several subjects, to counteract the wishes of my Government on each. I should have done so too without inducement; for I had no authority to make any demand or proposal in the cases of the Chesapeake and Orders in Council, or to act on any proposal which Lord Wellesley might be inclined to make to me: and it is perfectly clear that these subjects were not susceptible of any very material written illustrations which they had not already received. I do not, however, imagine that I was to make no use of the reflections upon them which you have furnished in your letter of the 23d November. I was, on the contrary, convinced that it would be proper to suggest them occasionally in conversation, with a view to dispose Lord Wellesley, and through him the British Government, to seek such fair and liberal adjustments with us as would once more make us friends.—Accordingly in my first conference I spoke of the affair of the Chesapeake, and the Orders in Council, and concluded my explanations, which did not lose sight of your letter of the 23d November, by expressing a wish that Lord Wellesley would allow me an early opportunity of a re-communication with him on these heads. From the disposition evinced by Lord Wellesley in the notice he took of these suggestions of that wish, I was inclined to hope that it might be in my power to announce to you by the return of the corvette, that a new Envoy would be charged, as the successor of Mr. Jackson, with instructions adapted to the

purpose of honourable accommodation. My letter to his lordship was written under the influence of this hope, and concludes, as you will perceive, with as strong an appeal to the disposition on which it rested, as could with propriety be made.—I recurred in subsequent conversations as often as occasion presented itself, to the attack on the Chesapeake, and to the Orders in Council. It soon appeared, however, that a new Envoy would not in the first instance be sent out to replace Mr. Jackson, and consequently that arrangement of these subjects was not in that mode to be expected. A special mission would still less be resorted to, and it was not likely that approaches to negotiation would be made through a Charge d'Affaires. It was still barely possible that though I had no powers to negotiate and conclude, the British Government might not be disinclined to make advances through me or that Lord Wellesley would suffer me, so far to understand the views of his Government, as that I might enable you to judge upon what conditions, and in what mode, arrangement was practicable. This was possible, though not very probable; but it finally became certain that no definite proposal would, for the present at least, be made to us through any channel, and that Lord Wellesley would not commit himself on the details to which I wished him to speak, but upon which, of course, I did not press him.—It only remains to refer you for the actual sentiments of this Government, with regard to future negotiations; with regard to the concluding paragraph of Lord Wellesley's letter to me, which is substantially the same with his recent verbal explanations; and to add, that in a short conversation since the receipt of his letter, he told me that if I thought myself empowered to enter upon and to adjust the case of the Chesapeake, he would proceed without delay to consider it with me.—I have not supposed that Lord Wellesley's letter requires any other than the common answer, and I have accordingly given the reply, of which a copy is now transmitted.—I have the honour to be, with great consideration, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

WM. PINKNEY.

FRANCE.—*Report of Capt. Duperre, commanding the French Maritime Force at the Isle of France.*—10th Sept. 1810.

General.—The events which have suc-

ceeded each other with such rapidity under your eyes have not allowed me a moment since my arrival to acquaint you with the operations of the squadron under my command during my late cruise. I hasten to discharge this duty.—Having sailed on the 14th of last March, the squadron proceeded to the latitude you had appointed, in which it captured two vessels, one from China and the other from Bengal. On the 1st of June, as there was no longer any chance of prizes, I quitted the cruising ground and steered for St. Augustin's Bay, to repair damages and refresh the crew. I found there an English whaler, which was foundering, and could not be taken possession of; I ordered her to be burned. The squadron in a few days left the Bay, well caulked and equipped.—A few days after at day-break on the 3d of July, we perceived three sail, within sight of Mayotte Island, to which we gave chase. I soon discovered that they were three Company's vessels. They were making off on the opposite tack, about eight miles to windward. The Bellona being an admirable sailer afforded a chance that I should be able to bring them to action about the middle of the day; but the currents of wind did not favour her, although they did the Minerva, who got within cannon-shot of them at three o'clock. As soon as I had given the signal for attack she gallantly ranged along the line to windward, engaged them within pistol-shot, passed the headmost ship for the purpose of obliging her to fall back, and driving her to leeward, broke their line and engaged them again. This brilliant manœuvre was on the point of being crowned with the most complete success, when the frigate in an instant lost her main-top-mast and fore-top-gallant-mast. Fortunately at this time I had got into the enemy's wake, in which I continued under a press of sail. The unexpected success he had obtained appeared to give him courage. He restored his line. I made the signal for a decisive engagement. At half past five I passed to leeward of his line, which was formed in close order. I placed myself opposite the centre vessel, which appeared to be that of the Commander, but in such a way that I could partially direct my fire against the whole three, which I engaged within less than pistol-shot at six o'clock.—The enemy at first kept up a brisk fire; their small arms were vigorously exerted. At seven o'clock the headmost ship gave

herself stern way, for the purpose of getting under shelter of the vessel next to her, which becoming exposed by such a manœuvre to the whole of my fire, called out that she had surrendered. I wished to take possession of her, and put a boat out for that purpose, but it was unfortunately swamped. The headmost vessel having endeavoured to pass under my stern, I suffered her to do so, and found her on the other side within pistol-shot. I attacked her vigorously, and at the second broadside she struck, and extinguished all her lights. The manœuvre she had made brought her close to leeward of the *Minerve* and *Victor*. I left her to these vessels, and proceeded to take possession of the ship that had struck, and to compel the third to surrender. I soon came up with her, and at the second broadside her lights were pulled down. I sent to take possession of these two vessels, and steered for the *Minerve*. I came up with her at 10 o'clock, and was exceedingly astonished to find her alone. The Captain informed me that the vessel which had struck, and which I had given up to him, taking advantage of the excessive darkness of the night, and particularly of the confidence derived from her having surrendered, had, contrary to the laws of honour and of war, escaped from under his guns. It was necessary to man the two other ships, called the *Ceylon* and the *Windham*, coming from the Cape, and proceeding to Madras. They carried each 30 guns and had 400 soldiers on board each vessel, belonging to the 24th regiment of foot; a General Officer, a Colonel and the colours were on board, which accounts for their obstinate resistance. The disgraceful runaway was called the *Astle*, and was the strongest ship of the three. On the 20th of August, in the morning, I got sight of the mountains of Port Imperial, in the Isle of France. At noon, I could see the port. The National flag was flying on the Isle de la Passe, and the signal "the enemy are cruising off La Mire." A three-masted vessel was at anchor under the fort, with French colours. I determined to touch there, or at least to take my direction from it. The sloop was a-head; the *Minerve* followed her. The *Victor*, on doubling the fort, received some shot both from it and the frigate,

and both instantly hoisted the English flag. It first struck me that all this part was in possession of the enemy. I made the signal to the squadron, which was still under sail, for close order, and to keep to windward. It was too late for the *Minerve*; she and the *Ceylon* had already entered the pass. In a few minutes she went through it, engaging the fort and the frigate. There was no longer hesitation. The passage was to be forced, the squadron carried in, and a diversion effected that might be useful to the country. I made sail, throwing out a signal to follow me. The *Windham* from some indecision was unable to do so. I entered the passage under easy sail, and the fire of the fort and the frigate. I gave the latter my whole broadside as I passed under the stern within cannon-shot. As soon as I had entered I discovered the French flag flying every where. The Isle de la Passe alone appeared to me to be in possession of the enemy. I joined my squadron, and gave orders that it should take a more advanced ground of anchorage, which was instantly done. I was informed from the shore of the situation of the island. On the 21st I placed the squadron near the shore, with the rear toward the rocks which skirt the Bay, and the van close to the coral reef. On the 22d the *Nereide* frigate, which was at anchor under the Isle of La Passe, was joined by the *Sirius*. Both of them made a movement to attack me. Your Excellency being aware of the weak state of my crews, in consequence of the prizes I had taken, and the engagements I had fought, sent me a detachment of fifty men from *La Manche* and *L'Entreprenant* sloop, with the necessary proportion of officers. I immediately stationed them on board the different vessels. The plan of attack was frustrated by the *Sirius* getting on the reef in the Channel, where she remained till night. On the 23d two more frigates made their appearance, and joined the former two at their anchorage at four o'clock. From the preparations they made, I had not the smallest doubt that they would attack me.—At five o'clock the four enemy's frigates advanced. One of them made for the *Minerve*, another for the *Ceylon*, and two for the *Bellone*, indicating by their movements that they meant to anchor and attack us.

(To be continued.)